Another Review of George Packer's Book

In the years to come, there will be more books that provide definitive accounts of what went wrong with Bush's Iraq policy. For now, the essential book is George Packer's, The Assassin's Gate. Here's part of a good review by the Armchair Generalist:

I've been finishing up George Packer's "The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq" this week. What can I say about this book that hasn't already been said in other places (also see here)? I thoroughly enjoyed it, as the author examines the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation of that country from many different perspectives. He has what I believe may be one of the best discussions of the pre-war Iraqi exiles' strategy and manipulation of the State Dept and DoD, really discussing their motivations and arguments over how they intended to rebuild Iraq after the invasion. Packer talks with the Coalition Provisional Authority and how they struggled to pull together a working government, without much assistance and possibly with great interference from the Bush administration. The savage infighting between State and DoD is clearly illustrated, and you have to wonder why Pentagon officials continue to force their view of foreign policy over that of the diplomatic professionals today. The whole transition from Garner to Bremer discussion is particularly enlightening.

(snip)

I was trying to find a good paragraph in this book that might summarize its overall mood, but that's a tough thing to do, given this long story with many characters. I think what Packer really resents is the casualness in which the Bush administration executed this war, so I'll close with this paragraph in his epilogue.

The long view of history made this war possible, and the long view of history made this war costly. Out of government, Drew Erdmann dwelled on the institutional character of the administration's mistakes, but in Baghdad in the summer of 2003 he had said that success or failure would largely depend on the judgment of individuals. I came to believe that those in positions of highest responsibility for Iraq showed a carelessness for human life that amounted to criminal negligence. Swaddled in abstract ideas, convinced of their own righteousness, incapable of self-criticism, indifferent to accountability, they turned a difficult undertaking into a needlessly deadly one. When things went wrong, they found other people to blame. The Iraq War was always winnable; it still is. For this very reason, the recklessness of its authors is all the harder to forgive.

The Armchair Generalist does a good job of listing the key elements of The Assassin's Gate.

As excellent as Packer's book is, I have deep reservations about his assertion that the Iraq War was winnable. On one level, Packer may be right but a great deal would have needed to happen and the inherent flaws were many, the presence of Cheney and Rumsfeld perhaps being the greatest handicap of the war. And if the war in Iraq had succeeded, where would Bush's military adventurism have ended? In Damascus? In Tehran? Where? But the details of Packer's book make it well worth reading.